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This study uses the London Stock Exchange (LSE), forced to demutualize due to major changes in 
its business environment, notably due to increased competition and technological advances, as 
field experiment to study corporate governance restructuring to adapt to new market conditions. 
The LSE improved its financial situation after demutualization and is an example of successful 
corporate governance restructuring. The LSE significantly restructured the composition of its 
board of directors following demutualization. The number of exchange members on the LSE board 
decreased after demutualization while the number of independent directors increased, pointing to 
a more “monitoring board”, in support of an agency theory approach. Interestingly, the large 
majority of these independent directors had experiences in diverse business. 
 
The LSE significantly reorganized its management team to adapt to the new strategies triggered 
by demutualization and modified its compensation by increasing performance-related payments. 
Results suggest that demutualization brings efficiencies if accompanied by changes in the 
governing bodies and in the incentive structures of the exchanges. Most of our results could be 
relevant also, for example, for firms going public, for smaller firms that are expanding their 
activities and searching for outside investors and for companies facing major changes in their 
business environments. 
 





uring the past 20 years, globalization and financial integration, the development of innovative 
technology, regulatory reforms and changes in investment opportunities have all affected the 
environment for stock exchanges by increasing competition and affecting the functioning of financial 
markets. In response to the new financial environment, a growing number of stock exchanges have demutualized 
and opted to go public, which raises questions on the future of financial markets. 
 
Most research on demutualization focuses on its impact on market performance. In comparison with mutual 
exchanges, demutualized and publicly listed exchanges generally operate more efficiently (Oldford & Otchere, 
2011), with improved financial performance, size and liquidity (Azzam, 2010; Otchere, 2006; Otchere & Abou-
Zied, 2008). 
 
Stock exchanges governance critically affects their performance, but the subject has been overlooked since 
our review indicates that no previous research analyzes in detail the effect on corporate governance of the 
conversion from a mutual organization to a publicly traded self-listed exchange structure. This lack of attention can 
be partially explained by the difficulties of collecting detailed data on stock exchange corporate governance prior to 
demutualization. 
D 
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We analyze the case of the London Stock Exchange (LSE), one of the premiere exchanges in Europe and 
one of the first to formally demutualise and be fully listed. Moreover, the availability of very detailed and complete 
data on corporate governance allows us to do a fine-grained analysis over a relatively long period of time. The LSE 
significantly improved its financial results after demutualization and hence provides an example of successful 
corporate governance restructuring following major changes in the business environment. 
 
Corporate governance (see Tricker, 2012, for a complete overview and discussion) essentially concerns the 
way power is exercised over corporate entities, including board activities and its relationship with shareholders or 
members, those managing the enterprise, and other legitimate stakeholders (Tricker, 2012, p. 4). We focus on the 
primary participants in these relationships: the board of directors and company management (led by the chief 
executive officer), who are central to corporate governance thinking and practice. We examine board composition, 
the structure of the LSE management team and management remuneration packages before and after 
demutualization. 
 
We observe significant changes in the LSE’s corporate governance after demutualization. In reorganizing 
its board, the exchange reduced the number of exchange members after demutualization and increased the number of 
independent directors, favoring a “monitoring board”, in support of an agency theory approach, rather than a 
“stakeholder board”. Most of the independent directors had experience in a variety of business, which relates to the 
concept of “board capital breadth” (Haynes & Hillman, 2010) that captures, among other facets of board 
heterogeneity, work experience in other industries. Haynes and Hillman find that board capital breadth is positively 
associated with strategic change. Our results support their view. 
 
The LSE also reorganized its management team to better adapt to new strategies triggered by 
demutualization, revising executive pay by increasing the fraction of performance-related payments to better align 
managerial and shareholder interests. 
 
Despite being limited to one stock exchange, the evidence we provide offers insights that should help 
researchers better understand the workings behind improved stock exchange performance generally reported by 
previous empirical studies and attributed to demutualization. Most of our results are also relevant for firms going 
public, for smaller firms that are expanding their activities and searching for outside investors and for companies 
facing major changes in their business environments. 
 
The next three sections review the literature on demutualization, introduce the case study of the London 
Stock Exchange, and present the hypotheses. We then present the data, methodology and empirical results. The final 
section discusses overall results and concludes. 
 
2. THE DEMUTUALIZATION OF STOCK EXCHANGES 
 
Traditionally, exchanges functioned as markets protected under national auspices because they represented 
national identities and enjoyed a monopolistic or near monopolistic position (see for example Doede, 1967; Pirrong, 
2000). For a long time, exchanges were mutually-owned organizations where members were also owners of the 
exchange with all the voting rights given by ownership. This monopolistic market view of exchanges became 
progressively obsolete during the last 20 years due to powerful developments in the environment in which 
exchanges operate. 
 
The key drivers of changes in the environment of exchanges are technological progress, especially the 
introduction of the Internet and the creation of innovative trading systems, and political reform (Elliott, 2002). 
Indeed, globalization contributed to increasing financial integration at the national and international levels and to 
reducing legal barriers to investing outside local financial markets. In Europe, financial competition was accelerated 
by the creation of the European Monetary Union and the introduction of the Investment Service Directive in 1993, 
replaced by the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (known as MiFID) in 2007. These directives aimed to 
harmonize European securities laws and regulation of financial markets and ease remote access to trading platforms 
for investors in other European member states. 
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With these changes in the financial environment, exchanges began to make focused efforts to attract 
investors and increase their market share. They had to rethink their traditional ownership structure in favor of a 
structure which accounts for the evolving exchange environment better (Aggarwal & Dahiya, 2006) and reassess 
their business strategies to face growing market competition. 
 
A growing number of exchanges (see Table 1) are opting to demutualize in the new environment, shifting 
from mutually-owned not-for-profit organizations into for-profit, investor-owned firms. This process offers the 
advantages of a separation between trading rights and ownership since shareholders provide capital to exchanges 
and receive profits but do not need to conduct trading on the exchange (Aggarwal, 2002). 
 
With demutualization, the objectives of exchanges should, in principle, change from focusing primarily on 
the interests of members/brokers and keeping costs and investments limited to financing  approved by members, to 
becoming firms that maximize profits by responding in a competitive manner to customer needs. 
 
Table 1:  Exchanges Demutualization 
Stock Exchange Year 
Stockholm Stock Exchange 1993 
Helsinki Stock Exchange 1995 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange 1996 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange 1997 
Borsa Italiana 1997 
Australian Stock Exchange 1998 
Wiener Borse 1999 
Athens Stock Exchange 1999 
Iceland Stock Exchange 1999 
Liffe 1999 
Simex 1999 
Singapore Stock Exchange 1999 
Bolsas y Mercados Espanoles 2000 
CME 2000 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange 2000 
London Stock Exchange 2001 
NYMEX 2000 
Sydney Futures Exchange 2000 
Toronto Stock Exchange 2000 




Osaka Stock Exchange 2001 
Oslo Exchanges 2001 
Philippines Stock Exchange 2001 
Swiss Exchange 2001 
Tokyo Stock Exchange 2001 
Budapest Stock Exchange 2002 
International Stock Exchange 2002 
New Zealand Stock Exchange 2002 
Swiss Stock Exchange 2002 
Lima Stock Exchange 2003 
Bursa Malaysia 2004 
Pacific Exchange 2004 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange 2004 
Bombay Stock Exchange 2005 
CBOT 2005 
JSE 2005 
Korea Exchange 2005 
American Stock Exchange 2006 
Ljubljana Stock Exchange 2006 
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Table 1 cont. 
Mexico Stock Exchange 2006 
NYBOT 2006 
NYSE 2006 
Teheran Stock Exchange 2006 
BOVESPA (Brazil) 2007 
Boston Stock Exchange 2007 
Bolsa da Colômbia 2007 
Thai Exchange 2008 
Tokyo Commodity Exchange 2008 
Chicago Board Options Exchange 2010 
Warsaw Stock Exchange 2010 
Bucharest Stock Exchange 2010 
Islamabad Stock Exchange 2012 
Source:  World Federation of Exchanges, stock market reports and stock market official websites. 
 
Demutualization can take different forms. The exchange can opt for a for-profit private company structure 
where only members or members and outside investors are the owners. The second option is to be a listed company 
with restrictions on the number of shares that can be owned by exchange members and non-members or, 
alternatively, without restrictions on trading. For most demutualized exchanges, a private structure is an intermediate 
step before becoming publicly traded, as with the Australian Stock Exchange, which began demutualization in 
September 1996 and was listed in October 1998. The London Stock Exchange and the Toronto Stock Exchange 
were fully listed one and two years after their demutualization in 2000. 
 
A number of exchanges have now demutualized. As illustrated in Figure 1, the markets that have 
demutualized represent, in 2011, 83% of all stock markets in the world versus 38% in 1998. Most of these stock 
exchanges are located in North America and Europe. Over 44% are publically listed (WFE Cost and Revenue 
Survey, 2011). 
 
Figure 1:  Stock Exchanges by Organization Structure 
 
There is relatively scant literature studying demutualization of stock exchanges. Most of the papers are 
theoretical and try to explain the advantages of conversion from a mutual non-profit to a for-profit investor-owned 
structure. The literature generally suggests that demutualization is the best strategy for exchanges to gain the 
flexibility and financing needed to compete in the global environment (Aggarwal, 2002). Demutualized stock 
exchanges can better access capital, respond to the fast-changing market place and facilitate the merger and 
acquisitions process (Aggarwal & Dahiya, 2006; Lee, 2002, 2003; Steil, 2002). Hart and Moore (1996) show that 
transforming the exchange organization from a mutual to an outsider-owned structure contributes to increasing 
efficiency. By avoiding concentration of ownership power, Mendiola and O’Hara (2003) argue, demutualization 
resolves conflicts between the exchange and its members. 
 
Most of the empirical literature on demutualization focuses on market performance. Schmiedel (2001, 
2002) employs different methods of frontier efficiency in his two papers to analyze the efficiency of exchanges and 
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includes the structure of these entities in the specification of his empirical model. Results are not conclusive. In his 
first paper, he finds a positive impact of demutualization on cost efficiency, and in his second paper he finds that 
mutual exchanges outperform demutualized exchanges in productivity. Serifsoy (2008) also studies the efficiency of 
exchanges, focusing on their governance, and finds that demutualized exchanges have higher technical efficiency 
than those with a mutual structure. However, he finds no evidence that publicly listed exchanges exhibit better 
efficiency than demutualized exchanges. 
 
Other research focuses on the impact of demutualization on market microstructure, especially in terms of 
liquidity, order flows and transaction costs. Despite using different empirical methods and different samples, all the 
analyses report an improvement in liquidity after demutualization (Hazarika, 2005; Mendiola & O’Hara, 2003; 
Treptow, 2006) and note that transaction costs decreased after demutualization (Krishnamurti, Sequeira, & Fangjian, 
2003). Aggarwal and Dahiya (2006) analyze the operating performance of 20 listed stock exchanges. Using different 
performance measures, including first day return, return on equity and operating margin, they find that most 
exchanges improved performance after listing. Otchere and Abou-Zied (2008) analyze the demutualization process 
of the Australian Stock Exchange and find that the conversion from mutual to publicly traded exchange was 
beneficial for the stock market in terms of operating performance and market liquidity. These results were confirmed 
more recently by Azzam (2010) and Oldford and Otchere (2011). 
 
But the conversion to a demutualized structure, although benefits accrue, brings new conflicts of interest 
due to the commercial nature of the exchanges and their explicit objective to maximize profits. A risk of conflict of 
interest may exist between exchanges’ regulatory role (surveillance of the markets and its participants, controlling 
and regulating trading, managing listings and admission to trading, etc.) and their profit objectives. Exchanges’ 
listing, trading and clearing fees, which are the main sources of revenue and represent more than 67% of total 
revenue
1
, come from the principal participants of exchanges: issuers, dealers and intermediaries. Under pressure to 
meet shareholders’ expectations and increase profits, a demutualized exchange may have less incentive to take 
actions against principal participants since they are the main source of revenue. This situation raises questions about 
the ability of the for-profit exchange to develop and implement appropriate listing, trading and admission standards, 
market surveillance and equitable treatment of customers. This conflict of interest may be more serious in an 
increasingly competitive environment where the exchanges may be pressed to reduce their regulatory, listing and 
disclosure criteria to better compete with other exchanges and attract more financial participants (IOSCO, 2001; 
Steil, 2002; Worthington & Higgs, 2006). These fears have been partially mitigated by the results of the empirical 
study of Reiffen and Robe (2011). They demonstrate that the exchange objective to maximize revenues does not 
conflict with, but depends on, the ability to implement strong trade practice rules. 
 
To reduce conflicts of interest, demutualized exchanges are encouraged by regulatory institutions to take a 
number of measures, including the establishment of a rigorous regulatory framework and issuing a clear legal 
statement of the role of the exchange in providing fair and efficient “public good”. Demutualized entities also need 
to strengthen corporate governance requirements and the board should be more responsible for the integrity of the 
regulatory process (IOSCO, 2001). 
 
Following demutualization, some exchanges opted for a partial or total separation of their commercial 
activities from regulatory functions. After demutualization, for example, the Hong Kong Stock and Futures 
Exchanges transferred certain market regulation functions to the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC). 
 
3. THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE SETTINGS 
 
The LSE, officially found in 1801, has witnessed many changes affecting its functioning and regulation. 
One of the most important reforms occurred on 27 October, 1986 with market deregulation, known as the “Big 
Bang.” Regulatory reforms included the abolishment of fixed commissions and the end of the voting rights system 
enjoyed by LSE individual members up until then. The ownership of member firms by outside corporations was 
allowed and all firms were able to operate both as broker and dealer. Deregulation was accompanied by technical 
reforms to modernize trading systems by introducing computers in the trade. These reforms made the exchange less 
                                                          
1
 Data provided by the 2011 Cost and revenue Survey, World Federation of Exchanges. 
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of a “club” and more of an international center of capital markets. Under the Companies Act 1985, the Exchange 
became a private limited company. The last of these reforms was the replacement of the governing council in 1991 
by a board of directors comprising executives, customers and users of the Exchange. 
 
In July 1999, the LSE announced its intention to demutualize and become a publicly limited company that 
operated on a fully commercial basis. According to the LSE, the new demutualized structure would help the 
exchange respond better not only to consumer needs but also to changes in the financial environment due to 
increasing competition from electronic trading systems. The separation of ownership from membership was 
intended to provide customers with the right services, create value for shareholders, and give the exchange more 
flexibility to respond to environment changes. Demutualization was approved by shareholders. In March 2000, the 
LSE became the “London Stock Exchange plc” and went public one year later, with a market capitalization of more 
than 2164 USD billion. Following public listing, LSE ownership by institutional investors increased rapidly from 
the original 15-to-20% of shares outstanding to 25% just one year later (2002) and to more than 66% in 2012. 
 
After exchange demutualization, the new LSE board urged the UK economics and finance ministry 
(commonly known as HM Treasury) to enact regulatory reforms. Traditionally, the LSE had two functions: to 
regulate, under the Financial Services Act (FSA), LSE trading in two markets (the main market and the Alternative 
Investment Market, AIM), and to regulate listings in the primary market through the UK Listing Authority (UKLA). 
Following demutualization, the LSE’s role as regulator of the primary market was transferred to the FSA. However, 
the LSE continues to regulate secondary markets, assisted by the Exchange’s Regulatory News Service (RNS) and 
the UK Listing Authority. 
 
Table 2:  LSE Major Financial Performance Indicators 


















Prior to demutualization .234 2,849.751 2,295.825 2442 15.31 12.64 51.5 
Post-demutualization .488 5,205.900 2,806.798 2940 15.71 23.93 111.08 
Difference .253*** 2,356.148* 510.973 498*** .39 11.29** 59.58*** 
P Value .00 .02 .22 .00 .88 .01 .00 
Data come from LSE annual reports, WFE and Thomson One database.  *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. This table contains the mean 
financial performance of the LSE. The prior to demutualization indicators are the mean indicators for the five-year prior to 
demutualization and the post-demutualization indicators are the mean indicators for the five years following the demutualization 
and the self-listing of the LSE. The turnover velocity is the ratio between the Electronic Order Book (EOB) turnover of domestic 
shares and their market capitalization. 
 
Demutualization seems to have contributed to improve the financial situation of the Exchange. When we 
look at the five years prior to demutualization, we find that major financial indicators of the LSE improved in the 
five years following demutualization. The post-conversion mean for total revenue, trading volume and market 
capitalization considerably outperformed the mean prior to demutualization (Table 2) and both profitability and 
performance ratios of the LSE improved after demutualization. The LSE mean ROA, net income margin and 
turnover velocity were 15.31%, 12.64% and 51.5%, respectively, prior to demutualization while they were 15.71%, 
23.93% and 111.08%, respectively, after demutualization (difference .39%, p-value .88; difference 11.29%, p-value 
.01 and difference 59.58%, p-value .00 respectively). Moreover, demutualization also helped attract more listed 
firms to the exchange. The post-conversion mean for the number of listed firms increased by 20% after 
demutualization. These results suggest that investors have benefited from LSE demutualization and self-listing 
strategies. 
 
The commercial nature of the demutualized exchanges prompted many to look for diversified services and 
new strategies to generate more revenue (Mendiola & O’Hara, 2003). Exchanges introduced performing trading 
platforms to ease access for institutional and foreign investors and established different types of cooperation with 
other exchanges, at times even merging with one another (Serifsoy, 2008). 
 
In this spirit, the LSE launched a web price service (Prism) in 2000 which offers free daily price updates to 
assist private investors. For both professional and private investors, the exchange also created, in 2000, extraMARK, 
a new market that specializes in innovative products. To further its internationalization, the LSE began promoting its 
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markets internationally (TechMARK and AIM) in 2001 through advertising, investor roadshows and seminars. The 
exchange expected to become the leader in international investment capital. The exchange promotes electronic 
shareholding trough the development, for instance, of a high-capacity network for customers using internet protocol 
(IP) communications technology. 
 
To attract more international investments, the LSE signed many contracts of cooperation to ease access of 
foreign companies to London capital markets. Since 2002, the LSE has attracted growing companies from New 
Zealand, the Nordic regions, Russia and Canada, among others. The exchange also strengthened its position in Asia-
Pacific by opening a regional office in Hong Kong in 2004 to attract Asian companies, especially Chinese 
companies, to London’s international market. The LSE and Tokyo Stock Exchanges established a new market in 
2008 for emerging companies which is operated by a joint venture in Tokyo. 
 
The LSE continued its strategy of internationalization by signing memorandums of understanding (MOU) 
with many exchanges to improve their international presence and facilitate trading in multiple markets. For instance, 
in 2007 the LSE signed cooperation agreements with the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, the Tokyo Stock Exchange and 
the Bahrain Stock Exchange (BSE). During the same year, facing increasing competition in Europe, the LSE 
acquired the Italian Stock Exchange in response to the merger between the NYSE Group and Euronext, which 
created the largest exchange in the world in market capitalization. The LSE is continuing its strategy of 
internationalization, although it has been a target of failed mergers with Deutsche Börse, the Nasdaq, OMX Group 
and the Canadian Stock Exchange (TMX). 
 
4. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT: HOW DEMUTUALIZATION MAY AFFECT CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
Exchanges demutualize to decouple ownership from members and separate the interests of the exchange 
from those of its members. The member-owned association structure fails to provide the flexibility and financing 
needed to compete today (Aggarwal, 2002) and to adapt to changing circumstances. As Domowitz and Steil (1999) 
argue, members may resist innovations, even if they would enhance exchange value, if the changes reduce demand 
for members’ intermediation services. Exchange members “resisted changes if these entailed additional costs, loss of 
revenue or competitive threat” when run as mutual associations. (Akhtar, 2002, p. 12). Several studies document 
cases where reforms in exchanges in the US, Europe and other regions have been hindered by the lack of consensus 
among their members (e.g. Cybo-Ottone, Di Noia, & Murgia, 2000; Hart & Moore, 1996). When ownership of the 
exchange is separated from membership under demutualization, it is not appropriate that trading members have 
exclusive authority over exchange decisions (Akhtar, 2002). 
 
The main task of the board is to direct the company, including strategy formulation and policy making 
(Tricker, 2012). It follows that exchanges can decrease the influence of trading members on corporate decisions by 
decreasing their representation on the board and replacing them by other type of directors who are more willing to 
consider appropriate competitive strategies. 
 
Drawing on these arguments, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The number of exchange members on the LSE board of directors has decreased since 
demutualization and the board has diversified. 
 
We explore two possible results. Once companies go public, the compliance role of the board tends to 
dominate and an independent board helps to legitimize this role. Corporate governance codes for good practice call 
for a wider use of independent non-executive directors, defined as ‘independent of management and free from any 
business or other relationship which could ultimately interfere with the exercise of independent judgment (…)’ 
(UK’s Cadbury Report, 1992). Independent directors are expected to provide oversight and supervision of executive 
activities, the achievement of corporate objectives and compliance with corporate governance requirements. To 
ensure effective supervision and auditing of management, a majority of board members should be truly independent. 
 
All these arguments draw on Jensen and Meckling’s agency theory (1976), which was the first to theorize 
about the functions of non-independent (insider) directors and independent (outsider) directors on boards. Agency 
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theory views the governance relationship as a contract between shareholders and managers. It argues that managers 
seek to maximize their own personal benefit, to take actions advantageous to themselves and detrimental to the 
shareholders. Based on these arguments, we examine if the LSE increased the proportion of independent directors 
after demutualization to create a board where a majority were independent. We term this type of board a 
“monitoring board.” 
 
Critics of this type of board structure suggest that, in practice, it gives too much power to the executive 
directors by making them responsible for strategy as well as the day-to-day running of the enterprise (Tricker, 2012). 
They contend that outside directors are inevitably pushed into a conformance and compliance mode rather than 
contributing to strategy formulation and policy-making. The reason for this lack of contribution to strategy 
formulation from outside directors is that they “may not have the relevant expertise or skills to add significantly to a 
board’s work, precisely because of their independence” (Lee, 2010, p. 280). 
 
Other commentators believe that an exchange’s board should include representatives from major interest 
groups (Holthouse, 2002), or stakeholders, given the for-profit motive. These stakeholders are, by definition, not 
independent. These arguments draw on stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), which identifies and models the groups 
which are stakeholders of a corporation and both describes and recommends methods by which companies can 
account for the interests of these groups. Previous to this theory, Jones and Goldberg (1982) had already argued that 
the presence of stakeholder directors on corporate boards is one of the most direct means for firms to incorporate 
stakeholder interests in corporate decision-making. 
 
The other possible effect of demutualization we examine is whether the LSE opted for a “stakeholder 
board,” by increasing the number of new stakeholders given the for-profit motive of the exchange after 
demutualization. We focus on two types of stakeholders that are particularly relevant in the new for-profit condition 
of exchanges: LSE institutional investors (LSE shareholders) and LSE customers (listed companies). 
 
LSE new investors are clearly stakeholders. For customers, a stock exchange demutualization creates a 
corporation that operates, ideally, in a customer-focused manner and can respond more easily and quickly to 
changes in the business environment (Hughes, 2002). 
 
Customers become even more important stakeholders after demutualization. We choose to examine listed 
companies as customers because, as Aggarwal (2002) explains, as competition among exchanges intensifies, trading 
commissions are likely to produce the most revenue and the key to an exchange’s success in generating 
commissions depends on generating trading volume. By increasing the number of listed companies, exchanges 
attract more orders and provide more liquidity to investors. 
 
Besides appropriate board representation, it is important that the exchange executive team must have the 
expertise and skills to implement new strategies enabling stock exchanges to efficiently compete in the more 
competitive environment. 
 
Demutualization involves transferring considerable exchange ownership and decision-making power from 
members to outside investors. As Aggarwal puts it, this means that “the old consensus decision-making of the 
exchange members is eventually going to be supplanted by a professional management team” Aggarwal (2002, p. 
108). We expect the new investors to encourage appointment of a professional management team with competences 
better adapted to the new profit-seeking strategies. In this rapidly developing environment, competences other than 
the traditional ones in financial markets become especially relevant (Holthouse, 2002), including knowledge of 
information systems, product development and commercial experience. We expect to observe LSE management 
restructuring of executives’ backgrounds after demutualization. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Following demutualization, the LSE executive team restructured to increase the proportion of 
managers with competences better adapted to the new business environment and strategies. 
 
The new executive team replacing the old decision-making system of the exchange members is going to be 
“presumably motivated by significant share ownership to increase efficiency and profits” (Aggarwal, 2002, p. 108). 
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In line with this argument, we expect that the nature of LSE investors after demutualization will prompt the board to 
revise executive remuneration packages to motivate them to increase efficiency, profits and shareholder value since 
exchanges are no longer monopolies and must run as efficient business companies. Management must have the right 
incentives to adapt and reinforce the new commercial culture of the exchanges after demutualization. 
 
As suggested by agency theory, executive and shareholder interests can be aligned by linking management 
remuneration to corporate performance objectives. We expect to see an increase in the proportion of remuneration 
for LSE management related to performance objectives following demutualization. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Following demutualization, the proportion of the remuneration package of the LSE executive team 
related to financial performance has increased. 
 
5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Data Sources 
 
The data on LSE board characteristics, including individual LSE directors, come mostly from LSE annual 
reports. The data were completed with LSE press releases and information in the corporate governance section on 
the LSE website and with information from Bloomberg BusinessWeek, Forbes, Reuters and company-director-
check.co.uk databases online. The information on LSE institutional investors and LSE listed companies comes from 
the database on the LSE website and from email exchanges with LSE support staff. The information on the 
remuneration packages of LSE management comes from the remuneration report in LSE annual reports. 
 
5.2 Methodology and Measures 
 
For testing the three hypotheses, we compare the pre-demutualization mean (1996 to 2000) to the post-
demutualization mean (2002 to 2007) of the relevant measures, as explained in detail below. We calculate the 
difference in means and report the two tail p-statistic from a paired t-test performed to check for the significance of 
the differences in means. 
 
5.2.1 Board Composition Measures 
 
We calculate the share of executive directors, non-executive directors, independent non-executive directors, 
the ratio of independent non-executive directors over non-executive directors, the share of member firms, investors
2
 
and listed companies represented on the LSE board of directors. We also report the share of foreign directors. 
 
5.2.2 Executive Team Competences Measures 
 
We calculate the proportion of managers on the executive team with traditional competences in financial 
markets, namely banking, stock brokerage, funds/investment management and securities. We also calculate a 
general competence measure we call finance which integrates all the previous competences and includes other 
finance experience. We calculate the proportion of managers with competences especially relevant for new LSE 
strategies (development of more efficient electronic trading systems, expansion of direct trading access for foreign 
investors, increases in the number of innovative products, alliances and mergers), which include information 
systems, marketing and sales, product development and commercial corporate communications, international and 
legal experience. We analyze CEO competences separately. 
 
5.2.3 Executive Team Remuneration Package Measures 
 
We calculate the fraction of executive remuneration that is variable and dependent on the achievement of 
performance targets which align with shareholders’ interests. The performance-related component of executive 
remuneration includes: 
                                                          
2 Substantial shareholders notified of 3% holding or more according to LSE annual reports. 
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1. Annual bonus, including cash payment and, in certain circumstances, a deferred award of shares, 
determined by two factors: the performance of the company against annual financial targets which include 
operating profit, earnings per share and cash flows and individual performance against personal objectives. 
2. Share option grants to reward the creation of long-term shareholder value. 
 




Table 3 shows the composition of the LSE board before and after demutualization. 
 







Executive directors 22% 23% 1% .41 
Non-executive directors 78% 77% -1% .41 
Independent non-executive directors 27% 53% 26%*** .00 
Independent non-executive directors/non-
executive directors 
34% 68% 34%*** .00 
Members 34% 13% -21%** .01 
Investors 0% 0% 0% NA 
Listed  51% 46% -5%† .59 
Foreign 6% 23% 17% .00 
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
The number of foreign directors significantly increased after demutualization: the mean proportion of 
foreign directors prior to demutualization was 6% while after demutualization it is 23% (difference 17%, p-value 
.00), one of the foreign directors being the CEO. These results support the view that the LSE opted for a more 
international board, in line with its internationalization strategy. 
 
Following demutualization, the LSE board has a majority of independent non-executive directors. Critics of 
boards with a majority of independent directors suggest that these independent directors are pushed into a 
conformance and compliance mode rather than contributing positively to the performance aspects of strategy 
formulation. This dominance of the compliance role over the strategic role occurs because the independent directors 
typically lack the industry-specific knowledge that their senior-executive counterparts have. To confirm this, we 
examine the competences of independent non-executive directors on the LSE board before and after 
demutualization, shown in Table 4. 
 







Traditional Competences Financial Markets:     
Stock-Broking 62% 0% -62%*** .00 
Banking 62% 19% -43%*** .00 
Funds Management and Securities 65% 38% -28%*** .00 
Financial 100% 81% -19%*** .00 
LSE New Strategy-Related Competences:     
Information Systems 0% 0% 0% NA 
Marketing and Sales 4% 0% -4% .30 
Product Development and Commercial 0% 0% 0% NA 
Corporate Communications 0% 0% 0% NA 
International 42% 53% 11%† .09 
Diverse Businesses 24% 81% 57%*** .00 
Legal 0% 38% 38%*** .00 
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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We see an important decrease in the independent directors’ competences in financial markets. The most 
remarkable observation is the absence of independent directors with stockbrokerage competences after 
demutualization, while prior to demutualization 62% of the independent non-executive directors had stock 
brokerage competences (difference -62%, p-value .00). Prior to demutualization, 62% of independent non-executive 
directors had banking competences while only 19% after demutualization did (difference -43%, p-value .00). Before 
demutualization, 65% of the independent non-executive directors had funds management and securities competences 
while only 38% did after demutualization (difference -28%, p-value .00). 
 
Due to the lack of industry-specific knowledge by independent directors, one of the greatest challenges 
independent directors face is to stay fully informed about the companies on whose boards they serve (George, 2013). 
The lack of industry-specific knowledge has been mitigated in the LSE by a combination of initiatives involving 
frequent communication between the LSE executive management team and independent directors. The LSE annual 
reports note that the executive management team informs the LSE board about their business responsibilities on a 
regular basis and participates in the board’s periodic strategy sessions. The LSE also schedules offsite strategy board 
sessions. The LSE chairman meets non-executive directors without the presence of executive directors on a number 
of occasions throughout the year. 
 
We expect that these meetings help to avoid independent directors’ conformance by allowing directors to 
discuss privately any concerns they may have about LSE management and to ask for improved governance 
initiatives or additional reviews. 
 
With regard to new strategy-related competences, the most salient result is the significant increase in the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors with diverse business experience, more than tripling after 
demutualization and representing the large majority of non-executive independent directors. The mean proportion of 
independent non-executive directors with diverse business experiences prior to demutualization was 24% while after 
demutualization it is 81% (difference 57%, p-value .00). Diverse business experience relates to the concept of 
“board capital breadth,” according to Haynes and Hillman (2010), which captures, among other facets of board 
heterogeneity, work experience in other industries. Haynes and Hillman find that board capital breadth is positively 
associated with strategic change. In support of this view, Golden and Zajac (2001) note that boards with a wider 
array of director experiences are likely to consider a broader array of strategic options. This is particularly relevant 
for the LSE, which made strategic changes after demutualization to better adapt to the evolving exchange 
environment. The presence of directors with experiences in diverse businesses may have triggered the 
implementation of these changes in LSE strategies. 
 
Table 5 shows executive team competences before and after demutualization. Consistent with Hypothesis 
2, the number of managers on the LSE executive team with strategy-related competences significantly increased 
after demutualization. The most salient results are the significant increases in the presence of managers with 
competences in information systems, which prior to demutualization was 3%, while after demutualization 41% 
(difference 38%, p-value .00), product development and commercial, which prior to demutualization was zero while 
after demutualization it is 49% (difference 49%, p-value .00) and international experience, which prior to 
demutualization was 3% while after demutualization it is 53% (difference 50%, p-value .00). Likewise, the number 
of managers with marketing and sales competences has also significantly increased, from zero prior to 
demutualization to 26% after demutualization (difference 26%, p-value .00). The number of managers with 
corporate communications competences increased from zero prior to demutualization to 10% after demutualization 
(difference 10%, p-value .00). The LSE in effect reorganized its management structure to enhance strategic 
development resulting from its more commercially-focused operations. The new competences of the LSE 
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Traditional Competences Financial Markets:     
Stock-broking 6% 13% 7% .39 
Banking 3% 23% 20%* .05 
Funds Management and Securities 0% 31% 31%*** .00 
Financial 80% 79% -1% .95 
LSE New Strategy-Related Competences:     
Information Systems 3% 41% 38%*** .00 
Marketing and Sales 0% 26% 26%*** .00 
Product Development and Commercial 0% 49% 49%*** .00 
Corporate Communications 0% 10% 10%*** .00 
International 3% 53% 50%*** .00 
Diverse Businesses 21% 4% -17%* .02 
Legal 10% 0% -10%* .03 
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
LSE changed its CEO after demutualization. Gavin Casey, the CEO from 1996 to 2000, was a chartered 
accountant with extensive experience in the finance and insurance industry, including banking, venture capital, 
corporate finance and securities. Prior to joining the LSE, Mr. Casey held various managerial positions in the 
securities sector, including group finance director and chief operating officer of the securities house Smith New 
Court PLC (acquired by Merril Lynch in 1995). 
 
He resigned on 15 September 2000, one day after shareholders, who opposed his plan to merge with 
Germany's Deutsche Boerse, turned on him at the annual meeting and called for him to step down (English, 2000). 
The LSE appointed Clara Furse CEO in January 2001
3
, the first woman and the first foreigner (born in Canada to 
Dutch parents and educated at schools in Colombia, Denmark and Britain) to occupy the position. She had extensive 
experience in global financial markets. She began her career as a broker and held various managerial positions in the 
global financial services sector, including executive and managing director, global head of Futures in Phillips & 
Drew (now UBS) and CEO of Rand Merchant Bank, Credit Lyonnais Rouse. 
 
Her international background, business experience and information technology expertise were specially 
relevant competences for the new LSE, including the internationalization focus and the creation of additional 
revenue by exploiting technology and information services. 
 
Table 6 shows the ratio of performance related compensation to total compensation of LSE management 
before and after demutualization. Consistent wih Hypothesis 3, the part of the remuneration package of LSE 
executive team members related to financial performance significantly increased after demutualization, from 30% 
before to 85% after demutualization (difference 56%, p-value .00). 
 
Table 6:  Performance Related Compensation of Management Before and After Demutualization 
 Prior-to Demutualization Post-Demutualization Difference p-value 
Performance-related compensation 30% 85% 56%*** .00 
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
The LSE extensively reviewed its remuneration policy to meet its governing objective of maximising 
shareholder value after demutualization. The exchange introduced several long term incentive plans in remuneration 
packages, taking the form of annual bonuses and share options grants to reward the creation of long term 
shareholder value. As a result, remuneration is predominantly performance-related now, reflecting the commitment 
to pay for performance and reward the management team only when performance goals are achieved. 
 
 
                                                          
3 -In the meantime Don Cruickshank assumed executive responsibility, supported by Martin Wheatley, Director of Business Development and 
Jonathan Howell, Director of Finance. LSE press release, 24 January 2001. 
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7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Following the wave of stock exchange demutualization during the last decade, we can draw lessons that 
may be useful to developing countries. The LSE was one of the first to demutualize, succesfully adapting to new 
market conditions and improving financial performance, according to major financial indicators. Therefore, it is an 
interesting case for the analysis of the impact of demutualization on corporate governance of stock exchanges and, 
more generally, for the analysis of corporate governance restructuring to adapt to new business environments. 
 
Previous research on the demutualization of stock exchanges, which focuses primarily on financial 
performance, in general indicates that demutualization improves performance. The corporate governance of 
exchanges has often been overlooked, although it significantly affects performance. However, since the financial 
crisis that began in 2007, the governance of financial infrastructure institutions, including stock exchanges, is now 
seen as critically important. 
 
Demutualization separates ownership from membership that automatically provides trading rights. Ideally, 
demutualization should help to introduce effective corporate governance, but this is only possible if it is 
accompanied by improvements in the incentive structure, decision-making and effective oversight of a governing 
board and a company structure (Akhtar, 2002). These improvements imply changes in the main decision-making 
bodies of corporations: the board of directors and the executive team. This is what we analyse in this study. 
 
Our results show that the LSE changed its board composition after demutualization, favoring a more 
“monitoring board,” with an increased number of independent directors, over a “stakeholder board,” probably to 
avoid conflicts of interest risks. Most of the new independent directors had experience in diverse businesses, 
suggesting that their experience may have triggered the implementation of significant changes in LSE strategies. 
The LSE also reorganized its management team and its remuneration packages to adapt to the new strategies. 
 
Although we must be cautious about generalizing from the LSE case study to other demutualized 
exchanges, our analysis suggests that demutualization processes bring efficiency if accompanied by changes in 
governing bodies and incentive structures, consistent with Akhtar (2002). Our findings are also consistent with 
arguments by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) that improved corporate governance may contribute to the reputation and 
credibility of an organization and enhance its financial performance. 
 
Most of our results may apply to firms going public, to smaller firms that are expanding their activities and 
searching for outside investors and for companies facing major changes in the business environment. Our results 
suggest that combining an independent board with significant restructuring of the top management to implement 
competitive strategies, along with revised executive pay packages, is a strategy that brings efficiencies. 
 
Future research could extend our analysis by studying the effects of demutualization on the corporate 
governance of other exchanges. Theoretical and empirical research on corporate governance suggests that differing 
institutional frameworks affect the structure of firms (Shleifer & Vishny, 1995). With regard to the evolution of 
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